mathematically perfected economy™ (MPE™)    1  :   the singular integral solution of  1) inflation and deflation,  2) systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, and  3) inherent, artificial multiplication of debt into terminal systemic failure;    2  :  every prospective debtor's right to issue legitimate promises to pay, free of extrinsic manipulation, adulteration, or exploitation of those promises, or the natural opportunity to make good on them;    3  :  our right to certify, to enforce, and to monetize industry and commerce by this one sustaining and truly economic process.

Rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add 'within the limits of the law' because law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so when it violates the rights of the individual.

Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, 4 April 1819

MORPHALLAXIS, January 14, 1979.


Thursday, September 4, 2008


At least insofar as his legal analysis pertains within the United States' political landscape, Thomas Jefferson gives us one of the most potentially important documents regarding usury. With his mission truncated against its broader responsibilities by the scope of what President Washington asked of him, Jefferson's "Opinion On The Constitutionality of a National Bank" circumnavigates the relevant issues, touching on them only as he can answer to the authority and dictates of the Constitution.

The broader responsibility of determining not only the legality, but the rectitude of a "national bank" however, at least includes:

  1. the questionable legality of granting a private entity a questionably useful federal existence;

  2. the questionable purposes of granting a private entity the falsified stature or guise of a federal entity;

  3. and the further question whether such an entity benignly serves the inherent interests of a republic.

    Should an entity imposing interest be considered merely to exist according to the simpler intended perception of a bank, potentially pretending, only by say-so, that an institution given the power to multiply even terminal debt upon us is in fact no more than a mere, ostensibly justified depository of some genre, somehow purportedly protecting, purportedly preserving, and even purportedly expediting commerce by the purported integrity of its currency? Do we answer for all these questions? Or do we give these claims a free pass, if only they can survive torturing a Constitution which obviously never created either the way or the end of their manifestation?

While Jefferson was asked only for his opinion on constitutionality, if in fact interest multiplies debt in proportion to a circulation, then critical further potential issues (and factual issues, since experienced both in the first Great Depression and the present re-escalation of debt) extend at least so far as the unanswered possibilities of inherently escalating dispossession and inevitable failure under terminal sums of debt, which we can attribute to the proposed circulation.

Unless the question of inherent multiplication of debt by interest is answered thus to the exclusion of exception (which is not proven either by experience or by formal proven theorem), reasonable procedure therefore dictates that it is incumbent upon the proposition of a currency subject to interest to:

  1. first prove the sustainability of commerce under any and all of its potential influences;

  2. and secondly, to prove a model for administration which can and will without exception, serve objectives mandated by the natural interests of the subject public.

Instead most remarkably, the authors of the "national bank" bill quite transparently sought in every available way and nuance to circumvent the written law, its intentions, and the will and needs of the people, whom by intention reign first and supreme in a republic. Consequently as we see, rather than obligatory justification, Jefferson had only a purported "convenience" of this proposed currency to respond to.

But as readers of this evaluation well know, the assertion of the related body of work is that no model has ever justified usury or proven its sustainability, as veritable observation instead corresponds to the proposition that to the degree that the essential maintenance of a circulation subject to interest requires re-borrowing interest and principal as subsequent sums of debt, debt is perpetually increased at an inherently escalating rate of periodic interest on an ever greater, eventually terminal sum of debt.

As I have likewise said for so long, this process can only perpetually devalue the currency by dedicating ever more of the circulation to servicing debt, while jeopardizing commerce to an ever greater degree by leaving ever less of the circulation to sustain the industry which is obligated to do so. Because the escalation is irreversible so long as a circulation is maintained, and because the multiplication is in proportion to the circulation, said process thus inevitably produces terminal costs of servicing debt.

The inherent processes of interest therefore, without reasonable exception, engender maximum possible and maximum practical lifespans for whatever industry is dependent upon, or otherwise directly or indirectly affected by, a circulation at all subject to interest.

Obviously, the spirit of the Constitution and very purposes of a republic oppose the establishment of an entity which must usurp the government to preserve itself against the people it intends without justification to dispossess so.

Yet as if an excuse or loophole were sought through which to impose a central bank on the fledgling nation, the question was only put to Jefferson whether this was "unconstitutional"; that is, was the authority of the Constitution so forward-seeing as to explicitly or implicitly forbid a National Bank, at least of the proposed kind?

In regard to the narrow, ulterior framing of this question however, we know one of two things most obviously and incontrovertibly of all, without which the question cannot have occasion:

  1. Because the proposed entity was never established by the Constitution, it certainly was not explicitly intended, unless the explicit intention were somehow inadvertently omitted.

    But of course, given the intended service, number, and caliber of contributions to the document, it is hardly plausible that the familiar potential existence of a national bank was simply omitted by mistake.

  2. On the other hand, the only other possibility is that exclusion of a "national bank" is intended.

    Further interpretations then, however concrete or unqualified, must most exhaustively follow this deduction, with the only ostensibly remaining question therefore being (if there is one, as the question presupposes) why the founders intentionally neither created a "national bank," nor explicitly permitted one.

    Opposition both to creating a central bank or providing for its creation therefore is the plausible intention.

So we account for the two possible cases with no more than this, leaving the only potentially remaining question, why?

Further reinforcing this deduction of intended exclusion, whereas the Constitution indeed lacks a perfected prescription for sustaining illimitable commerce without inflation, deflation, systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, or inherent multiplication of debt by interest, it is impossible for the proposed currency to offer a genuine such solution:

  1. interest makes it impossible to solve inflation and deflation of the circulation, because a circulation without inflation or deflation can only exist in perpetual equality with the remaining value of the assets it represents;

    It is impossible to solve inflation and deflation of a circulation at all subject to interest therefore, both because interest compels us to pay more than the value of the represented asset out of the circulation, and because unless we are to forfeit three homes every time we build one, interest requires us to re-borrow or otherwise inflate the circulation so much as interest, merely to resolve artificial monetary obligations which are the sum of principal and interest;

    The only way to solve inflation and deflation therefore is to pay off debts which are not subject to interest, at the rate of depreciation or consumption of the related asset.

  2. it is impossible or impractical even to maintain a circulation subject to interest without multiplying debt in proportion to the circulation;

    To whatever degree perpetual deflation of debt service out of the general circulation must be replenished by re-borrowing interest and principal as subsequent, ever escalating sums of debt, the processes of interest are ever more destructive and eventually terminal;

  3. because the costs or value of money or property are only systemically manipulated via inflation, deflation and/or interest, giving such a currency only these powers, and ensuring the ever active effects at least of interest, itself ensures that we will suffer ever adverse systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property;

  4. interest makes it impossible to solve price inflation, as the costs of all production affected by interest are perpetually escalated upward by the costs of sustaining all industry subject however directly or indirectly to inherent, irreversible multiplication of debt;

  5. interest makes it impossible for us to exchange between ourselves whatever we deem to be equal measures of production, because the costs of all financed production are increased by all manifestations of interest, however eventually manifested directly or indirectly in the essentially ever escalating costs of production.

  6. the whole scheme of a national bank usurps the very position of the true creditor, who accepts the note of the debtor, which note is ultimately only redeemable in the creditor's production, while, for all said reasons, the nature of the imposed currency can only undermine its pretended integrity to do so:

    It is the producer of the subject production whose faith in the paper or any other media must be proven for the notes of usury to prove their presumed or purported integrity. It is the redeemability of this production by way of exercising the paper, or gold, or silver, or ether, or even space, however this exercising is possible therefore, which proves that integrity; and so, as a media subject to interest perpetually multiplies debt to the usurper so much as we are compelled to re-borrow from them whatever principal and interest we are compelled to pay, this in fact dedicates ever more of the circulation to servicing debt, thus making it impossible but to dedicate ever less of a circulation to sustaining commerce. The redeemability of a currency subject to interest therefore inherently and irreversibly deteriorates to an ever greater degree, thus destroying its integrity ever moreso even than it is compromised in its very beginning, and making the full measure of necessary redeemability to the true creditor impossible.

    Eventually in fact, merely for the intent to take so much unearned profit from the potentially unwitting subjects of such a system, all of the circulation is dedicated to servicing debt, ultimately leaving nothing whatever even to potentially be dedicated to redeeming the currency in its inherent obligation to the original creditor and actual producer of the property comprising the credit.

    The only remaining needed solution of all these factors beyond solution of inflation and deflation therefore, is to ensure the perpetual redeemability of the currency. Only the eradication of interest and solution of inflation and deflation make this possible, because only this can preserve the value of the currency and sustainability of illimitable industry which can service the credit it provides in its own production.

    Thus the undue and unjustified profit of any such entity as a central bank, which imposes interest not for the people, but for its own sake, itself makes rectitude impossible.

Most notably in regard to the objects of a republic therefore, these properties and ramifications of a currency subject to interest would never be the purposes of any public mandate — at least not that of a knowledgeable or intelligent public. On the contrary, the purposes of usury are solely restricted to the wish and intention to take unearned gain from the populace, which unearned and undeserved gains are eventually so crippling in extents expedited and perpetuated only by deception, that they are inevitably and soon enough terminal.

Furthermore, even if the imperfect efforts of the authors of the Constitution to specify a currency not in terms of interest, but measured in gold or silver, cannot itself certify that the authors at least looked elsewhere for monetary rectitude, the effort to instill perpetual value to currency at least represents an intention to avoid the consequences of interest, however well or not well perceived, for the prospective facade of a privately held "national bank" was certainly not unfamiliar to them.

Pre-revolution America in fact was plagued only by modestly divided such banking institutions as Hamilton now proposed to consolidate even to the exclusion of pre-existent competitors. Thus like the present so called Federal Reserve System, his proposition was an institution which would be even more corruptible, recklessly powerful, and adverse. His remarkable proposal essentially divulges the scope of its intended usurpation even by dissolving all competition to accomplish the ends of usury. It makes his central bank the alpha predator and ultimate destroyer of free enterprise.

While dissolution of ostensible competition among "banks" might little (or not) restrain such accomplishments against the usual will and inherent purposes of a republic, the central question is now rhetorical, and the answer we yet hear is mere dogma, that the intrinsic processes of interest only somehow comprise a benevolent, private "national bank" — no more than the mere benign container which "a bank" can be supposed to be.

On the contrary, a currency subject to interest is inherently malevolent, malignant, irreversibly escalated in its adverse objects, and inevitably terminal; and as we see, the least effort to unravel the processes of interest decidedly determines these consequences to us.

Thus even if the founders had somehow simply failed either to establish or provide for a "national bank," the scope of "constitutionality" to which Thomas Jefferson was asked to respond must first be recognized to be too narrow even to engage in the most relevant issue, which the Constitution obviously does not address. If right were intended, the question instead was/is: "Even if the Constitution can at worst be construed to be vague in regard to the proposition of a [private] "national bank," what are the relevant issues, and what is their solution?" After all, Hamilton's proposition originated not of public mandate, but on the contrary, from a minority faction which sought to usurp public mandate to dispossess the public of its right to its own wealth.

Jefferson's Opinion would largely concur nonetheless with practically any well intentioned, neutral academic analysis on the score of constitutionality for which it was intended.

Regardless of the unduly restricted scope to which he was asked to answer, his Opinion should itself have prevailed in defeating the "national bank" proposition, for Jefferson's arguments are not only self evident, but hold both to the provided accounts of pre-established law, and to Constitutional law. His Opinion is even so excellent and fundamental in my opinion as to provide the principal model or beginning point for further formative opinion on that score, for at least any contrary opinion would have to provide genuine invalidation of Jefferson's careful record to stand.

The little I can add to Jefferson's Opinion derives from my thesis of mathematically perfected economy™, the potency of which, if any, dissolves the dogma of the proposed act's obvious monetary and political ploys.

I have included the entirety of Jefferson's Opinion, including a vital footnote1 from my source, "The Portable Jefferson," page 261, which footnote explains that Jefferson prepared this Opinion at the request of President Washington.

This footnote itself reveals much about the nature, ambition and tactics of the effort to impose usury upon the fledgling nation. History demonstrates that President Washington should have been suspicious of this nature, its ambitions, and its tactics, for of course, even as such an unconstitutional, private consortium of corporations in the guise of a federal bank have since been imposed upon us by betrayal of the public vote of 1912, all previous such "banks," including the present, failed for these very obvious irregularities, many of which Jefferson perceptively and succinctly raises. After all, Jefferson is vindicated even to the extent that the ensuing Federal Reserve System imposed the most remarkable failure possible, but 15 years after embarking in its inherently contrary operation.

Just as Hamilton's usurpation intended nonetheless, the present pretended federal bank is retained upon us even as its subsequent life cycle is inherently dedicated to the same direction, purposes and end of the first.

For its distinguished, intimate, and useful merits then, I consider Jefferson's Opinion to be obligatory study for all good opinions, and particularly for just opinions of the general public. As a leading intellectual and founder, he reaches not only into the very historic arguments against such a bank raised in the writing of our Constitution, but into the intended language, structure, purposes of the structure and language, and very recorded intentions of the authors of the Constitution, which Mr. Washington and posterity would have been better advised to heed. After all, history proved President Washington wrong, and exposed the ulterior motives and intended irregularities of Hamilton in the inherent failures and disservice of every such "bank" since, the records and principles of which apply to eternity.

  Further remarks follow the introductory footnote, enclosed within red outlines.


Jefferson wrote this opinion at President Washington's request. Upon receiving it, Washington submitted the opinion to Alexander Hamilton, author of the bank bill, for rebuttal. In arguing the case for constitutionality of a national bank, Hamilton advanced the doctrine of implied powers[!]. Convinced by Hamilton's reasoning, Washington signed the bill into law. Jefferson's opinion, ["]being advisory only,["] was not published for many years.



Hamilton of course had grafted himself to the President to advocate his purposes by just such sleights of fact as asserted "implied powers."

The whole thrust of the Constitution on the contrary, is to rule out any and every such assumed implication by explicit declaration of the very bounds of government, which of course Jefferson well cites in his following opinion. How little the President must have understood or appreciated this then, that he could have been persuaded otherwise, and no less than by Hamilton's independent assertion of "implied powers."

Why after all, if there were such implied powers, did not such insightful authors declare their scope? In fact it is because they so intended otherwise for such good reasons, that the Constitution even exists. The very nature of the document is explicit proscription of delegated power.

Why then yet is Washington confounded so that he ultimately decides against Jefferson's clear report of intended and explicit bounds of Constitutional authority?

To his credit as a general, Washington adhered to a custom of asking his subordinates for their opinions. The virtue of his approach to military conflict provided him with the broadest available thinking, which his military prowess distilled to the most diligent accounting for the resources and factors at hand.

Moreover, in military matters, the combination of advantages regularly increases their sum, whereas the opposite may apply to any principle which in fact is ruined by combination with its converse, however seemingly forceful or parallel its effects may be misgiven.

In financial matters particularly then, Washington wholly lacked a prowess equivalent to his military approach. He was no general of monetary rectitude; and in his practically certain confusion over such vital matters, we can assume he was probably largely swayed by the persistent attendances of Hamilton, who certainly sought not to fully apprise the President of the ramifications of usury, but instead to tempt him with purported "convenience" and further unqualified advantages or obligations, which Jefferson accounts well for in terms of constitutionality.

Most of all narrowings or exclusions of importance still, it might even have been at Hamilton's insistence or manipulation that Washington chose to focus merely on the constitutionality question, for who but the advocate of what is not right would intend that its whole rectitude not be subject to question?

As an advocate of usury, Hamilton was essentially the enemy of a republic. He sought immediately to conduce a people freed by their own intention and bloodshed into deciding a forfeiture which would destroy liberty and free enterprise to ever greater degrees, so long as what he wanted existed.

Quite to the contrary, his advocates today propose it was Hamilton's foresight which paved the way to industrialization and prosperity. This I likewise submit only intends to perpetuate the purposed pretensions Hamilton served long ago, which still are refuted forever in the fact that unless interest does not inherently multiply debt in proportion to a circulation, the obvious object of all this is instead to dispossess industry of its production, which is even the only power of usury.

In its further transparency then, all this is only accomplished by the deception that the people have no preferable or veritable alternative to prosper sustainably — as if it is not even our natural disposition to sustain prosperity by a perpetually representative currency, comprised of our own, legitimate promises to pay, free of usury imposed by wholly redundant and degenerative rigamarole.

Reputedly arrogant, and detested by many in his own time, Hamilton was eventually shot and killed in a duel by Vice President to Jefferson, Aaron Burr. To that time, it is recorded that Hamilton had been involved in so many as ten duels in which ultimately no shot was fired at either combatant by their foe.

A Smithsonian article details how Hamilton — probably hoping for an advantage in discharging his pistol with a single-set trigger which Burr was not made aware of — may have mishandled his weapon after secretly setting its trigger. Burr, not being apprised that the pistols were so fitted, did not set his.

As marksmen are well aware, the few ounces of pull of Hamilton's set trigger, versus the reported, ordinary 10 to 12-pound pull and far greater travel Burr was faced with, would have allowed Hamilton not only to discharge his aimed weapon in far less time, but to do so with far less tendency to deviate from the target. The secreted advantage instead backfired on Hamilton, who accidentally discharged the hair trigger of his weapon early, probably as he was about to take aim. Convinced Hamilton had just blundered in an attempt to kill him, Burr took aim and discharged a fatal shot.

Perhaps as a fitting tribute to his service to usury, Hamilton's pistols were purchased by Chase Manhattan Bank in 1930, and of this writing are reportedly preserved by J. P. Morgan Chase & Company, principal of the present, private "Federal Reserve."

As to the assertion Jefferson's Opinion was not published for so long because he had produced it only in an advisory capacity, I for one anticipate instead that it was purposely suppressed in the pattern of the republic's foe, which by the vast undue wealth it inevitably accumulates, comes to own and to control for its purposes, even and particularly, the vital conduits of information.

Jefferson's vital Opinion yet survives.


The bill for establishing a National Bank undertakes among other things:

  1. To form the subscribers into a corporation.

  2. To enable them in their corporate capacities to receive grants of land; and so far is against the laws of Mortmain.

    [Original editorial footnote: Though the Constitution controls the laws of Mortmain so far as to permit Congress itself to hold land for certain purposes, yet not so far as to permit them to communicate a similar right to other corporate bodies.]


    Yet in this feature furthermore, perhaps it is even more evident today how the disposition of the intended "bank" was utterly corrupt:

    If we understand for example that the intention of a central bank is unearned acquisition of all possible wealth, and if we further understand that the most accessible and unlimited wealth of the time might have been land, we can understand how blatantly the disposition is revealed in the intent to acquire land. Otherwise, the proposition of a bank as an owner of land, and particularly as potentially the supreme owner of land, is simply preposterous as a service to the people, or means of sustaining their intended independence.

  3. To make alien subscribers capable of holding lands; and so far is against the laws of Alienage.

  4. To transmit these lands, on the death of a proprietor, to a certain line of successors; and so far changes the course of Descents.

  5. To put the lands out of the reach of forfeiture or escheat; and so far is against the laws of Forfeiture and Escheat.

  6. To transmit personal chattels to successors in a certain line; and so far is against the laws of Distribution.

  7. To give them the sole and exclusive right of banking under the national authority; and so far is against the laws of Monopoly.


    The intention to monopolize, particularly if it cannot be demonstrated without exception to serve the people, is of course a most dangerous one. This suspicious ambition particularly should have raised the attention of President Washington to all the further irregularities of the proposition.

  8. To communicate to them a power to make laws paramount to the laws of the States; for so they must be construed, to protect the institution from the control of the State legislatures; and so, probably, they will be construed.

I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the State or to the people." To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.

The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States by the Constitution:

  1. They are not among the powers specially enumerated, for these are:
    1. A power to lay taxes for the purpose of paying the debts of the United States; but no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid. Were it a bill to raise money, its origin in the Senate would condemn it by the Constitution.

    2. "To borrow money." But this bill neither borrows money nor ensures the borrowing [of] it. The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any other money holders, to lend or not to lend their money to the public. The operation proposed in the bill, first, to lend them two millions, and then to borrow them back again, cannot change the nature of the latter act, which will still be a payment, and not a loan, call it by what name you please.

    3. To "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States, and with the Indian tribes." To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who erects a bank, creates a subject of commerce in a dollar in its bills; so does he who makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines; yet neither of these persons regulates commerce thereby. [Nonetheless, availability and appreciation or devaluation of a compulsive currency do regulate commerce, always to the inherent disadvantage or offense against some, however to the benefit of usually far fewer others.] To make a thing which may be bought and sold, is not to prescribe regulations for buying and selling. Besides, if this was an exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending as much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For the power given to Congress by the Constitution does not extend to the internal regulation of the commerce of a State, (that is to say of the commerce between citizen and citizen), which remain exclusively with its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say, its commerce with another State, or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. Accordingly the bill does not propose the measure as a regulation of trade, but as "productive of considerable advantages to trade." [however undefined] Still less are these powers covered by any other of the special enumerations.

  2. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the two following:
    1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, that is to say, "to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare." For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.


      Woe to Washington most of all then for disrespecting this clear flaw in Hamilton's transparent proposition of "implied powers."

      It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.

      It is an established rule of construction where a phrase will bear either of two meanings, to give it that which will allow some meaning to the other parts of the instrument, and not that which would render all others useless. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect. It is known that the very power now proposed as a means was rejected as an end by the Convention which formed the Constitution. A proposition was made to them to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amendatory one to empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected, and one of the reasons for that rejection urged in debate was, that then they would have a power to erect a bank, which would render the great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies on the subject, adverse to the reception of the Constitution.

    2. The second general phrase is, "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers." But they can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank therefore is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.

      It has been urged that a bank will give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes. Suppose this were true: yet the Constitution allows only the means which are "necessary," not those which are merely "convenient" for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one, for there is not one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience in some instance or other to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one power, as before observed. Therefore it was that the Constitution restrained them to the necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant of power would be nugatory.

      But let us examine this convenience and see what it is. The report on this subject, page 3, states the only general convenience to be, the preventing the transportation and re-transportation of money between the States and the treasure. (for I pass over the increase of circulating medium, ascribed to it as a want, and which, according to my ideas of paper money [*subject to interest*] is clearly a demerit.) Every state will have to pay a sum of tax money into the treasury; and the treasury will have to pay, in every State, a part of the interest on the public debt, and salaries to the officers of government resident in that State. In most of the Sates there will still be a surplus of tax money to come up to the seat of government for the officers residing there. The payments of interest and salary in each State may be made by treasury orders on the State collector. This will take up the greater part of the money he has collected in the state [interest of course, being by far the greater], and consequently prevent the great mass of it from being drawn out of the State. If there be a balance of commerce in favor of that State against the one in which the government resides, the surplus of taxes will be remitted by the bills of exchange drawn for that commercial balance. And so it must be if there was a bank. But if there be no balance of commerce, either direct or circuitous, all the banks in the world could not bring up the surplus of taxes but in the form of money. Treasury orders then, and bills of exchange may prevent the displacement of the main mass of the money collected, without the aid of any bank; and where these fail, it cannot be prevented even with that aid.

      Perhaps indeed, bank bills may be a more convenient vehicle than treasury orders. But a little difference in the decree of convenience, cannot constitute the necessity which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power.

      Besides; the existing banks will, without a doubt, enter into arrangements for lending their agency, and the more favorable, as there will be a competition among them for it; whereas the bill delivers us up bound to the national bank, who are free to refuse all arrangement, but on their own terms, and the public not free, on such refusal, to employ any other bank. That of Philadelphia I believe, now does this business, by their post-notes, which, by an arrangement with the treasury, are paid by any State collector to whom they are presented. This expedient alone suffices to prevent the existence of that necessity which may justify the assumption of a non-enumerated power as a means for carrying into effect an enumerated one. The thing may be done, and has been done, and well done, without this assumption; therefore, it does not stand on the degree of necessity which can honestly justify it.

      It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the States, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a single State. So it would be still more convenient that there should be a bank, whose bills should have a currency all over the world. But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or that the world may not go on very well without it.

      Can it be thought that the Constitution intended that for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most ancient and fundamental laws of the several States; such as those against Mortmain, the laws of Alienage, the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, the laws of monopoly? Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostitution of the laws, which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. Will Congress be too straight-laced to carry the constitution into honest effect, unless they may pass over the foundation-laws of the State government for the slightest convenience of theirs?

      The negative of the President is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature:

      1. The right of the Executive.

      2. Of the Judiciary.

      3. Of the States and State legislatures.

      The present is the case of a right remaining exclusively with the States, and consequently one of those intended by the Constitution to be placed under its protection.

      It must be added however, that unless the President's mind on a view of everything which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the Constitution; if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor of their opinion. It is chiefly for case where they are clearly misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the Constitution has placed a check in the negative of the President [and via the President, to the negative of Congress].


While Jefferson answers most admirably for the question of constitutionality, and while in the least of time the failure of the established "bank" proved Hamilton and Washington wrong on all counts of rectitude, the question of constitutionality itself presumes the founders perfectly anticipated and solved not only the ramifications of interest, but the age old problems of inflation and deflation, which together, further pave all the ways for systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property to every possible further disadvantage.

Is it right then to challenge the perfection of the Constitution for some loophole or crack by which usurers might impose the very abuses which the republic revolted against, and which the republic exists foremost of all to prevent? Or is it right even if we do find the Constitution wanting in perfection, instead to perfect it?

Indeed, the Constitution denies any claim to perfection from its very outset; and the first phrase of its Preamble answers these questions for us. The Preamble asserts that the Constitution and the union it establishes exist for the primary purpose of perfecting the union, not abusing it. Our lawful duty even in all cases then, is clearly to see to the perfection of government by law (by the Constitution), wherever we may find imperfection in either.

Whether it is rightly assumable that certain humans had accounted for the greatest potential crime against us or not, the question of constitutionality therefore asks, that if even such illuminated humans had not accounted for every possible nuance of subversion by which that crime might even be established as a quite imperfect, permanent fixture against us, that we give way to the crime. Effectively, it asks so much as if the law forbids us to kill, has it in all ways prevented us from granting such a privilege, committed by perhaps a certain weapon? The question seeks for a way to break the very spirit of the Constitution and the very purposes of the republic which it established.

The question of constitutionality at the time however may not even have been fair on further grounds, for without broader intellectual evaluation of all potential issues, the lack of a perception of a perfected monetary system certainly left the door open much as we have today, to resorting even to reckless structures which can serve no one but the usurer. The question of constitutionality thus asked us to do the worst thing, merely on the say-so of such unworthy sources as intended the very crime.

Nonetheless, no intellectual exercise of their time resolved these issues. The founders were submerged in the stupendous issues of creating a government itself existing for the perfection of government. They were further hampered not only by a revolution and the dire need to form such a government expediently, but by the equally unqualified predispositions of a world with which their commerce and industry would have to interact, and which expected interaction with imperfect currencies — hampering even the potential to pay debts incurred in events such as the revolution.

This is not to excuse any shortsightedness. Neither is it to compromise the credit the founders are due for realizing that a central bank exists as such a thing to be repulsed, rather than given free reign to forever afterward preclude representation to the inevitable destruction of liberty and justice.

What the founders therefore lacked in their time was a singular prescription for economy without inflation, deflation, systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, and inherent multiplication of debt by interest. So for myself and others as well, I say that anyone like or of the original genre nonetheless would have welcomed that prescription should it have been available to them — and thus that with it, they would have prevailed against the Hamiltons of yesterday as well as those of today and tomorrow.

They have no choice, if they intend to prosper according to the fruit of their doings.

"To find the players in all the corruption of the world, 'Follow the money.' To find the captains of world corruption, follow the money all the way."

mike montagne — founder, PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, author/engineer of mathematically perfected economy™ (1979)

While 12,000 homes a day continue to go into foreclosure, mathematically perfected economy™ would re-finance a $100,000 home with a hundred-year lifespan at the overall rate of $1,000 per year or $83.33 per month. Without costing us anything, we would immediately become as much as 12 times as liquid on present revenue. Transitioning to MPE™ would apply all payments already made against existent debt toward principal. Many of us would be debt free. There would be no housing crisis, no credit crisis. Unlimited funding would immediately be available to sustain all the industry we are capable of.

There is no other solution. Regulation can only temper an inherently terminal process.

If you are not promoting mathematically perfected economy™, then you condemn us to monetary failure.

© COPYRIGHT 1979-2009 by mike montagne and PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.COPYRIGHT 1979-2009 by mike montagne and PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. TRADEMARKS: PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, Mathematically Perfected Economy™, Mathematically Perfected Currency™, MPE™, and PFMPE™ are trademarks of mike montagne and PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, perfecteconomy.com. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.


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