it is their right, it is their duty...
mathematically perfected economy™ (MPE™) 1 : the singular integral solution of 1) inflation and deflation, 2) systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, and 3) inherent, artificial multiplication of debt into terminal systemic failure; 2 : every prospective debtor's right to issue legitimate promises to pay, free of extrinsic manipulation, adulteration, or exploitation of those promises, or the natural opportunity to make good on them; 3 : our right to certify, to enforce, and to monetize industry and commerce by this one sustaining and truly economic process.
Rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add 'within the limits of the law' because law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so when it violates the rights of the individual.
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, 4 April 1819
EVALUATION OF JEFFERSON'S OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NATIONAL BANK
Thursday, September 4, 2008
CONTEXT / INTRODUCTION
At least insofar as his legal analysis pertains within the United States' political landscape, Thomas Jefferson gives us one of the most potentially important documents regarding usury. With his mission truncated against its broader responsibilities by the scope of what President Washington asked of him, Jefferson's "Opinion On The Constitutionality of a National Bank" circumnavigates the relevant issues, touching on them only as he can answer to the authority and dictates of the Constitution.
The broader responsibility of determining not only the legality, but the rectitude of a "national bank" however, at least includes:
While Jefferson was asked only for his opinion on constitutionality, if in fact interest multiplies debt in proportion to a circulation, then critical further potential issues (and factual issues, since experienced both in the first Great Depression and the present re-escalation of debt) extend at least so far as the unanswered possibilities of inherently escalating dispossession and inevitable failure under terminal sums of debt, which we can attribute to the proposed circulation.
Unless the question of inherent multiplication of debt by interest is answered thus to the exclusion of exception (which is not proven either by experience or by formal proven theorem), reasonable procedure therefore dictates that it is incumbent upon the proposition of a currency subject to interest to:
Instead most remarkably, the authors of the "national bank" bill quite transparently sought in every available way and nuance to circumvent the written law, its intentions, and the will and needs of the people, whom by intention reign first and supreme in a republic. Consequently as we see, rather than obligatory justification, Jefferson had only a purported "convenience" of this proposed currency to respond to.
But as readers of this evaluation well know, the assertion of the related body of work is that no model has ever justified usury or proven its sustainability, as veritable observation instead corresponds to the proposition that to the degree that the essential maintenance of a circulation subject to interest requires re-borrowing interest and principal as subsequent sums of debt, debt is perpetually increased at an inherently escalating rate of periodic interest on an ever greater, eventually terminal sum of debt.
As I have likewise said for so long, this process can only perpetually devalue the currency by dedicating ever more of the circulation to servicing debt, while jeopardizing commerce to an ever greater degree by leaving ever less of the circulation to sustain the industry which is obligated to do so. Because the escalation is irreversible so long as a circulation is maintained, and because the multiplication is in proportion to the circulation, said process thus inevitably produces terminal costs of servicing debt.
The inherent processes of interest therefore, without reasonable exception, engender maximum possible and maximum practical lifespans for whatever industry is dependent upon, or otherwise directly or indirectly affected by, a circulation at all subject to interest.
Obviously, the spirit of the Constitution and very purposes of a republic oppose the establishment of an entity which must usurp the government to preserve itself against the people it intends without justification to dispossess so.
Yet as if an excuse or loophole were sought through which to impose a central bank on the fledgling nation, the question was only put to Jefferson whether this was "unconstitutional"; that is, was the authority of the Constitution so forward-seeing as to explicitly or implicitly forbid a National Bank, at least of the proposed kind?
In regard to the narrow, ulterior framing of this question however, we know one of two things most obviously and incontrovertibly of all, without which the question cannot have occasion:
So we account for the two possible cases with no more than this, leaving the only potentially remaining question, why?
Further reinforcing this deduction of intended exclusion, whereas the Constitution indeed lacks a perfected prescription for sustaining illimitable commerce without inflation, deflation, systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, or inherent multiplication of debt by interest, it is impossible for the proposed currency to offer a genuine such solution:
Most notably in regard to the objects of a republic therefore, these properties and ramifications of a currency subject to interest would never be the purposes of any public mandate — at least not that of a knowledgeable or intelligent public. On the contrary, the purposes of usury are solely restricted to the wish and intention to take unearned gain from the populace, which unearned and undeserved gains are eventually so crippling in extents expedited and perpetuated only by deception, that they are inevitably and soon enough terminal.
Furthermore, even if the imperfect efforts of the authors of the Constitution to specify a currency not in terms of interest, but measured in gold or silver, cannot itself certify that the authors at least looked elsewhere for monetary rectitude, the effort to instill perpetual value to currency at least represents an intention to avoid the consequences of interest, however well or not well perceived, for the prospective facade of a privately held "national bank" was certainly not unfamiliar to them.
Pre-revolution America in fact was plagued only by modestly divided such banking institutions as Hamilton now proposed to consolidate even to the exclusion of pre-existent competitors. Thus like the present so called Federal Reserve System, his proposition was an institution which would be even more corruptible, recklessly powerful, and adverse. His remarkable proposal essentially divulges the scope of its intended usurpation even by dissolving all competition to accomplish the ends of usury. It makes his central bank the alpha predator and ultimate destroyer of free enterprise.
While dissolution of ostensible competition among "banks" might little (or not) restrain such accomplishments against the usual will and inherent purposes of a republic, the central question is now rhetorical, and the answer we yet hear is mere dogma, that the intrinsic processes of interest only somehow comprise a benevolent, private "national bank" — no more than the mere benign container which "a bank" can be supposed to be.
On the contrary, a currency subject to interest is inherently malevolent, malignant, irreversibly escalated in its adverse objects, and inevitably terminal; and as we see, the least effort to unravel the processes of interest decidedly determines these consequences to us.
Thus even if the founders had somehow simply failed either to establish or provide for a "national bank," the scope of "constitutionality" to which Thomas Jefferson was asked to respond must first be recognized to be too narrow even to engage in the most relevant issue, which the Constitution obviously does not address. If right were intended, the question instead was/is: "Even if the Constitution can at worst be construed to be vague in regard to the proposition of a [private] "national bank," what are the relevant issues, and what is their solution?" After all, Hamilton's proposition originated not of public mandate, but on the contrary, from a minority faction which sought to usurp public mandate to dispossess the public of its right to its own wealth.
Jefferson's Opinion would largely concur nonetheless with practically any well intentioned, neutral academic analysis on the score of constitutionality for which it was intended.
Regardless of the unduly restricted scope to which he was asked to answer, his Opinion should itself have prevailed in defeating the "national bank" proposition, for Jefferson's arguments are not only self evident, but hold both to the provided accounts of pre-established law, and to Constitutional law. His Opinion is even so excellent and fundamental in my opinion as to provide the principal model or beginning point for further formative opinion on that score, for at least any contrary opinion would have to provide genuine invalidation of Jefferson's careful record to stand.
The little I can add to Jefferson's Opinion derives from my thesis of mathematically perfected economy™, the potency of which, if any, dissolves the dogma of the proposed act's obvious monetary and political ploys.
I have included the entirety of Jefferson's Opinion, including a vital footnote1 from my source, "The Portable Jefferson," page 261, which footnote explains that Jefferson prepared this Opinion at the request of President Washington.
This footnote itself reveals much about the nature, ambition and tactics of the effort to impose usury upon the fledgling nation. History demonstrates that President Washington should have been suspicious of this nature, its ambitions, and its tactics, for of course, even as such an unconstitutional, private consortium of corporations in the guise of a federal bank have since been imposed upon us by betrayal of the public vote of 1912, all previous such "banks," including the present, failed for these very obvious irregularities, many of which Jefferson perceptively and succinctly raises. After all, Jefferson is vindicated even to the extent that the ensuing Federal Reserve System imposed the most remarkable failure possible, but 15 years after embarking in its inherently contrary operation.
Just as Hamilton's usurpation intended nonetheless, the present pretended federal bank is retained upon us even as its subsequent life cycle is inherently dedicated to the same direction, purposes and end of the first.
For its distinguished, intimate, and useful merits then, I consider Jefferson's Opinion to be obligatory study for all good opinions, and particularly for just opinions of the general public. As a leading intellectual and founder, he reaches not only into the very historic arguments against such a bank raised in the writing of our Constitution, but into the intended language, structure, purposes of the structure and language, and very recorded intentions of the authors of the Constitution, which Mr. Washington and posterity would have been better advised to heed. After all, history proved President Washington wrong, and exposed the ulterior motives and intended irregularities of Hamilton in the inherent failures and disservice of every such "bank" since, the records and principles of which apply to eternity.
• Further remarks follow the introductory footnote, enclosed within red outlines.
1ORIGINAL EDITORIAL FOOTNOTE FROM "THE PORTABLE JEFFERSON" (p. 261):
Jefferson wrote this opinion at President Washington's request. Upon receiving it, Washington submitted the opinion to Alexander Hamilton, author of the bank bill, for rebuttal. In arguing the case for constitutionality of a national bank, Hamilton advanced the doctrine of implied powers[!]. Convinced by Hamilton's reasoning, Washington signed the bill into law. Jefferson's opinion, ["]being advisory only,["] was not published for many years.
THE QUESTION OF IMPLIED POWERS
Hamilton of course had grafted himself to the President to advocate his purposes by just such sleights of fact as asserted "implied powers."
The whole thrust of the Constitution on the contrary, is to rule out any and every such assumed implication by explicit declaration of the very bounds of government, which of course Jefferson well cites in his following opinion. How little the President must have understood or appreciated this then, that he could have been persuaded otherwise, and no less than by Hamilton's independent assertion of "implied powers."
Why after all, if there were such implied powers, did not such insightful authors declare their scope? In fact it is because they so intended otherwise for such good reasons, that the Constitution even exists. The very nature of the document is explicit proscription of delegated power.
Why then yet is Washington confounded so that he ultimately decides against Jefferson's clear report of intended and explicit bounds of Constitutional authority?
To his credit as a general, Washington adhered to a custom of asking his subordinates for their opinions. The virtue of his approach to military conflict provided him with the broadest available thinking, which his military prowess distilled to the most diligent accounting for the resources and factors at hand.
Moreover, in military matters, the combination of advantages regularly increases their sum, whereas the opposite may apply to any principle which in fact is ruined by combination with its converse, however seemingly forceful or parallel its effects may be misgiven.
In financial matters particularly then, Washington wholly lacked a prowess equivalent to his military approach. He was no general of monetary rectitude; and in his practically certain confusion over such vital matters, we can assume he was probably largely swayed by the persistent attendances of Hamilton, who certainly sought not to fully apprise the President of the ramifications of usury, but instead to tempt him with purported "convenience" and further unqualified advantages or obligations, which Jefferson accounts well for in terms of constitutionality.
Most of all narrowings or exclusions of importance still, it might even have been at Hamilton's insistence or manipulation that Washington chose to focus merely on the constitutionality question, for who but the advocate of what is not right would intend that its whole rectitude not be subject to question?
As an advocate of usury, Hamilton was essentially the enemy of a republic. He sought immediately to conduce a people freed by their own intention and bloodshed into deciding a forfeiture which would destroy liberty and free enterprise to ever greater degrees, so long as what he wanted existed.
Quite to the contrary, his advocates today propose it was Hamilton's foresight which paved the way to industrialization and prosperity. This I likewise submit only intends to perpetuate the purposed pretensions Hamilton served long ago, which still are refuted forever in the fact that unless interest does not inherently multiply debt in proportion to a circulation, the obvious object of all this is instead to dispossess industry of its production, which is even the only power of usury.
In its further transparency then, all this is only accomplished by the deception that the people have no preferable or veritable alternative to prosper sustainably — as if it is not even our natural disposition to sustain prosperity by a perpetually representative currency, comprised of our own, legitimate promises to pay, free of usury imposed by wholly redundant and degenerative rigamarole.
Reputedly arrogant, and detested by many in his own time, Hamilton was eventually shot and killed in a duel by Vice President to Jefferson, Aaron Burr. To that time, it is recorded that Hamilton had been involved in so many as ten duels in which ultimately no shot was fired at either combatant by their foe.
A Smithsonian article details how Hamilton — probably hoping for an advantage in discharging his pistol with a single-set trigger which Burr was not made aware of — may have mishandled his weapon after secretly setting its trigger. Burr, not being apprised that the pistols were so fitted, did not set his.
As marksmen are well aware, the few ounces of pull of Hamilton's set trigger, versus the reported, ordinary 10 to 12-pound pull and far greater travel Burr was faced with, would have allowed Hamilton not only to discharge his aimed weapon in far less time, but to do so with far less tendency to deviate from the target. The secreted advantage instead backfired on Hamilton, who accidentally discharged the hair trigger of his weapon early, probably as he was about to take aim. Convinced Hamilton had just blundered in an attempt to kill him, Burr took aim and discharged a fatal shot.
Perhaps as a fitting tribute to his service to usury, Hamilton's pistols were purchased by Chase Manhattan Bank in 1930, and of this writing are reportedly preserved by J. P. Morgan Chase & Company, principal of the present, private "Federal Reserve."
As to the assertion Jefferson's Opinion was not published for so long because he had produced it only in an advisory capacity, I for one anticipate instead that it was purposely suppressed in the pattern of the republic's foe, which by the vast undue wealth it inevitably accumulates, comes to own and to control for its purposes, even and particularly, the vital conduits of information.
Jefferson's vital Opinion yet survives.
OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NATIONAL BANK1 (THOMAS JEFFERSON, FROM "THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON," pgs 261-265)
The bill for establishing a National Bank undertakes among other things:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the State or to the people." To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.
The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States by the Constitution:
While Jefferson answers most admirably for the question of constitutionality, and while in the least of time the failure of the established "bank" proved Hamilton and Washington wrong on all counts of rectitude, the question of constitutionality itself presumes the founders perfectly anticipated and solved not only the ramifications of interest, but the age old problems of inflation and deflation, which together, further pave all the ways for systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property to every possible further disadvantage.
Is it right then to challenge the perfection of the Constitution for some loophole or crack by which usurers might impose the very abuses which the republic revolted against, and which the republic exists foremost of all to prevent? Or is it right even if we do find the Constitution wanting in perfection, instead to perfect it?
Indeed, the Constitution denies any claim to perfection from its very outset; and the first phrase of its Preamble answers these questions for us. The Preamble asserts that the Constitution and the union it establishes exist for the primary purpose of perfecting the union, not abusing it. Our lawful duty even in all cases then, is clearly to see to the perfection of government by law (by the Constitution), wherever we may find imperfection in either.
Whether it is rightly assumable that certain humans had accounted for the greatest potential crime against us or not, the question of constitutionality therefore asks, that if even such illuminated humans had not accounted for every possible nuance of subversion by which that crime might even be established as a quite imperfect, permanent fixture against us, that we give way to the crime. Effectively, it asks so much as if the law forbids us to kill, has it in all ways prevented us from granting such a privilege, committed by perhaps a certain weapon? The question seeks for a way to break the very spirit of the Constitution and the very purposes of the republic which it established.
The question of constitutionality at the time however may not even have been fair on further grounds, for without broader intellectual evaluation of all potential issues, the lack of a perception of a perfected monetary system certainly left the door open much as we have today, to resorting even to reckless structures which can serve no one but the usurer. The question of constitutionality thus asked us to do the worst thing, merely on the say-so of such unworthy sources as intended the very crime.
Nonetheless, no intellectual exercise of their time resolved these issues. The founders were submerged in the stupendous issues of creating a government itself existing for the perfection of government. They were further hampered not only by a revolution and the dire need to form such a government expediently, but by the equally unqualified predispositions of a world with which their commerce and industry would have to interact, and which expected interaction with imperfect currencies — hampering even the potential to pay debts incurred in events such as the revolution.
This is not to excuse any shortsightedness. Neither is it to compromise the credit the founders are due for realizing that a central bank exists as such a thing to be repulsed, rather than given free reign to forever afterward preclude representation to the inevitable destruction of liberty and justice.
What the founders therefore lacked in their time was a singular prescription for economy without inflation, deflation, systemic manipulation of the cost or value of money or property, and inherent multiplication of debt by interest. So for myself and others as well, I say that anyone like or of the original genre nonetheless would have welcomed that prescription should it have been available to them — and thus that with it, they would have prevailed against the Hamiltons of yesterday as well as those of today and tomorrow.
They have no choice, if they intend to prosper according to the fruit of their doings.
"To find the players in all the corruption of the world, 'Follow the money.' To find the captains of world corruption, follow the money all the way."
mike montagne — founder, PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, author/engineer of mathematically perfected economy™ (1979)
While 12,000 homes a day continue to go into foreclosure, mathematically perfected economy™ would re-finance a $100,000 home with a hundred-year lifespan at the overall rate of $1,000 per year or $83.33 per month. Without costing us anything, we would immediately become as much as 12 times as liquid on present revenue. Transitioning to MPE™ would apply all payments already made against existent debt toward principal. Many of us would be debt free. There would be no housing crisis, no credit crisis. Unlimited funding would immediately be available to sustain all the industry we are capable of.
There is no other solution. Regulation can only temper an inherently terminal process.
If you are not promoting mathematically perfected economy™, then you condemn us to monetary failure.
COPYRIGHT 1979-2009 by mike montagne and PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. TRADEMARKS: PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, Mathematically Perfected Economy™, Mathematically Perfected Currency™, MPE™, and PFMPE™ are trademarks of mike montagne and PEOPLE For Mathematically Perfected Economy™, perfecteconomy.com. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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