The new nation was faced with obfuscations of how to pay the debts of the revolution. Alexander Hamilton proposed to concentrate otherwise undue power in a central government, which he asserted should “establish credit” by going into sufficiently impressive further sums of debt to private banks of foreign nations.
Never elaborating on the consequences of usury, or invalidating the plausibility of the people or government issuing its own, unsubjugated promises to pay… Alexander Hamilton simply insisted that “establishing credit” was necessary, particularly to acquire further “credit” to prepare for and engage in further conflicts.
Wisdom will immediately see the danger in this arrangement then; that vast wealth would be perpetually and exhaustively multiplied to certain private, foreign banks, which are simply forfeited the people’s right to contract between each other (which is all that money is); thus that by imposing involuntary servitude together with interest’s obligation to maintain a vital circulation, and particularly then, together with the power to withhold the further credit necessary to sustention at ever greater cost, these unassented “banks” are endowed outside and averse to any regular vehicle of representation, with the vast, unaccountable, limitlessly manufacturable power to dictate altogether the disposition, might, and therefore even the prevalence and failure of oppositions. The power so carelessly given then, is even the power to destroy all resistance to the untethered purposes of the power to perpetuate itself against us.
This illimitable, unassented access to power and wealth is what Hamilton’s so called Federalists actually wanted by his advocations that we borrow with the purported ambition of establishing credit.
But of course, because there is but one consequence of a currency subject to interest, Hamilton’s insisted course would make it ever more impossible to sustain the form of debt under which he sought to subjugate us. There would be practically nothing important eventually which such banks would not own or control, directly or indirectly.
Because Hamilton’s course could never compete with a truly representative monetary system… so, under the intentional guise of “necessary credit,” Hamilton misleadingly advocated what actually amounted to multiplying indebtedness, which he sought by simply evading the prospective fact of a singular genre of perpetually redeemable, representative, and readily available money. By the designs of this evasion, Hamilton promoted a tunnel vision disposed to self-multiplying indebtedness, with its attendant subversions of representation and deteriorations of social infrastructure. Pretending to understand himself that credit subject to usury is an advantage, Hamilton further sought to deceive us of the ever more destructive further proposition of actually seeking indebtedness, to the purported advantage of the impossible and destructive goal of proving a capacity to sustain ever greater self-multiplying debt.
In the pattern of all servants of usury and its attendant forms of unearned gain… Hamilton thus sought, by simply evading any genuine consideration of the one rectified design of money, to sell us to a form of debt which could only compel us to perpetually re-borrow interest and principal as ever greater sums of debt, merely to maintain a circulation. In the end, as Jefferson would project truly, this illegitimate and unassentable power above all others would make the banks the direct or indirect owners of all industry; would indebt our progeny to bankruptcy — and so, by the process of dispossession inherent to an inherently usurious currency… would ultimately leave our children homeless on the continent their forefathers had conquered in a revolution dedicated actually to liberation from all those attendant forms of unearned gain.
Fortunately then, Thomas Jefferson resisted these ulterior intentions, asserted by Hamilton on behalf of “banking” interests who hoped only to gut a sufficiently naive or un-united nation.
Because the intellectual challenges of Hamilton’s evasion and obfuscation were largely beyond President Washington and Vice President John Adams, Jefferson was the light by which to see, dragging along the weight of others, who, walking in their sleep, represented the naivete Hamilton hoped to exploit. But so, we might not have been a country long if President Washington had tended to any greater degree to reinforce Hamilton’s intended monetary miscarriages, even as Hamilton dedicated much effort to gaining and preserving not only Washington’s favor, but putrifying Washington’s and Adams’ cabinets until President Adams fired Hamilton’s relentless and probably well rewarded lackeys.
A hundred years later, we would see this same kind of effort succeed by betrayal of political promises, acting outside the intended channels of representation within the formation of the naive Wilson Administration. The later subversion of course would result in the creation of the falsely named “Federal Reserve” System — even exceeding Hamilton’s vehicle as a confederation of 12 private banks which are neither federal nor real reserves of anything.
Amidst these similar, earlier events, the back-stabbing, traitorous Hamilton would eventually be mortally shot in a duel with Jefferson’s Vice President, Aaron Burr — but not until Hamilton so succeeded in discouraging Jefferson from further enduring his relentlessly unjust assaults, that with Jefferson so much as retired from the senseless public bickering, Hamilton had his first “national bank” — the very kind of vehicle necessary to the destruction of the fledgling nation.
That bank of course soon failed under its intended, relatively unrestrained offenses against the people. But Hamilton sought, and to a substantial degree succeeded, in a triangle of evils: to indebt us, to militarize us, and to involve us in foreign conflicts which the record shows would have preserved the interest of the usurers he served.
Had Hamilton had his way across eternity, we would never understand that the people are the ostensible final authority, only instrument, and most deserving beneficiary of the one possible design for a perpetually redeemable currency. Hamilton instead would have had private, extrinsic parties issue our promises to pay each other — as Jefferson warned, at the perpetual cost of escalating dispossession, ensurance of usurpation, and gravest probability of ulterior strife.
How then should we have paid our debts to France?
The answer to this question rests not in perfect hindsight, but in principle: If in separating ourselves from subjugation to the Bank of England, we had re-financed all debt without interest and scheduled its payment according to the depreciation or consumption of the related assets, then not only could we alone in the world have guaranteed our creditor repayment, protected from devaluation by inflation, deflation, or multiplication of debt by usury… at the same time, at virtually no cost whatever, we could have financed all the industry and prosperity we were capable of, that we could have repaid our debt by retiring our additional promises to France from circulation with the least taxation of a perfectly sustainable, far superior volume of industry.
We would also of course have precluded private banks from multiplying their wealth all the further at our equally great cost, into the usurpation which eventually manifested in the so called Federal Reserve System.
In other words still, if mathematically perfected economy™ had emerged with the revolution, there would have been no actual monetary debt to France, because we would have paid for whatever we needed by issuing promises which would have been perpetually redeemable in the products of our industry — the integrity of which notes would have co-survived with the emergence of our nation.
As history therefore attests, the only solvent principle before us was to issue promises to pay to France; allow those promises to pay to be naturally redeemed in terms of our industry/wealth wherever those promises to pay would be honored; and to retire the notes from the circulation by taxation, to apply the costs of war justly, without redundant cost, and ultimately, without inflation.
At the end of Adams’ term, the country was deadlocked over the ensuing election. As he had already assaulted the character of many others for his masters’ ulterior purposes, Hamilton published a broadly read letter laced with rude ad hominems to discredit Adams, hoping the so called Federalists too would prevail over usury’s greatest rival, Jefferson. By a slim margin, Adams, the sitting incumbent, would not be re-elected.
Despite Hamilton’s vicious disinformation campaign, Jefferson achieved a tie of the electoral vote, and the decision between the eventual President Jefferson and Vice President Burr fell to Congress. Jefferson privately warned Adams that if the “Federalist conspirators” prevailed, violence would erupt. After thirty-three consecutively tied votes, hoping only to appease or disarm Hamilton’s destructive following, President Adams asked the popular Jefferson to honor a national debt subject to usury, asserting what they both knew — that this would defuse the ulterior thrust for unearned gain championed by Hamilton’s intended obfuscation, that the government would fall not to Hamilton’s “Federalists,” but to the ever honorable Mr. Jefferson.
Yet even to this reassurance Jefferson replied, “I will not enter office with imperfect freedom to follow the dictates of my own judgment.”